Climate change poses a serious threat to the international community and therefore leads to global action on all fronts. Many governments adopt different “green energy programs.” To the extent that state aid is essential for the initiation and maintenance of these green energy programmes, the SCM agreement is directly involved in this regard. Unfortunately, the agreement does not provide for any derogations from these programs, even if the waivers are made due to growing concerns of the global community. In these circumstances, a practical solution should be found within the existing framework and be inferred from an interpretation of this SCM Convention on the basis of current jurisprudence. The WTO`s collective jurisprudence probably supports the view that certain renewable energy programmes are “general infrastructure projects” of a state and are therefore excluded from the government`s financial contributions under Article 1.1, point a) iii) of the SCM Convention. 60 See THE BBC Monitoring South Asia, `Nepal pitches for foreign investment in energy, connectivity`, London, 29 January 2015; Fintech Agreement, “Gov`t to take special measures to boost public spending for infrastructure development: Finance Minister,” Mumbai, 20 January 2015; Asia News Monitor, `Thailand: Government Accelerating Infrastructure Development in Special Economic Zones`, Bangkok, 27 January 2015. Infrastructure development is particularly important because their absence or absence generally means that the benefits of trade agreements cannot be exploited at all. See Douglas Brooks, Benno Ferrarini and Eugenia Go, “Bilateral Trade and Food Security,” ADB Economics Working Paper Series No. 367, September 2013, at 20. If, within six months of the adoption of the panel`s report or the appeal body`s report, the member has not taken appropriate steps to eliminate the adverse effects of the subsidy or withdraw the subsidy, the DSB gives the requesting member permission to take action based on the degree and nature of the adverse effects found, unless the DSB decides by mutual agreement to reject the application. 32 WTO, “Disputes by agreements: subsidies and countervailing measures,” www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_agreements_index_e.htm?id=A20 (called 27 January 2014).