In view of the above, it is clear that, in the second appeal, the Khannas did not request an appeal against the cooperation agreement of 18.05.2004. The agreement in question was to be accepted and had served as a basis for the dismissal of the action in the first action. Article 31 of the Special Act provides for exemption from the erasure of instruments. It provides that any person against whom “a written act is annigable or countervailable and who has a well-founded fear that the act, if not pending, may cause him serious harm” may have it annulned or appealed. The applicant`s failure to seek annulment of the cooperation agreement and to consider that the allegations they made as evidence in the action on infringement and infringement “without proof” of all those allegations were fatal. The cooperation agreement of 18.05.2004 served as the basis for the rejection of the first action. It was therefore of the utmost importance that the Khanna seek appropriate relief against this document. None, even in the form of a statement, were sought. Moreover, in the first legal action, the findings were made on the basis of the legality of the document in question, drawn up against them by the Khannas and drawn up without their knowledge. Their right to property, i.e. by surrogacy, sales agreement, receipt, will, etc., all of 12.05.2004, were also definitively erased by the cooperation agreement. 28. The first action sought a decree of ownership and omission – based on ownership of the property – as shown by a clear reference to section 5 of the Specific Relief Act.
In the present case, the second appeal makes more or less the same refusals, except that the Khannas rely for the first time on the transaction contained in the sales agreement of 16.06.2004. . .